



Concern over runs on banks and thrifts has led
these institutions to be singled out as "special"
intheU.S. economy.lnlast week's Letter, we
argued that banks' (i.e., all depository institu-
tions) role as providers of payment services
might justify such concern.
Historically, significant changes in public policy
toward banks have come from widespread bank
runs. As a result of the banking panic of 1907,
for example, the Federal Reserve was estab-
lished to act as the lender-of-Iast-resort to the
banking industry to help prevent runs. Some
years later, the banking panics of the 1930s led
to the creation of federal deposit insurance to
reduce depositors' fears about the safety of their
funds. In 1985, "bank holidays" for thrifts cov-
ered by state-sponsored insurers in Ohio and
Maryland again raised calls for changes, includ-
ing the establishment of mandatory federal
deposit insurance for all depository institutions.
In this Letter, we examine what makes banks
vulnerable to runs, discuss current safeguards,
and suggest some alternative approaches to solv-
ing the problem of bank runs.
Liquidity
Some analysts argue that bank runs arise from
the illiquidity of bank assets compared to lia-
bilities. In particular, banks fund longer-term
assets, many of which cannot be readily sold in
the market, with deposits that are available on
demand or with relatively short notice. When a
large unexpected volume ofwithdrawals occurs,
a bank that cannot meet the demand with exist-
ing reserves and highly marketable assets must
try to sell less marketable assets (or borrow
against them). The result can be sizable losses
that lead to bank failures and a disruption ofthe
banking system and the economy in general.
Concern over the liquidity of bank liabilities and
the illiquidity of their assets served asthe foun-
dation for legislation that gave the Federal
Reserve lender-of-Iast-resort authority when it
was established in 1913. Specifically, the legis-
lation intended the Federal Reserve to supply
liquid reserves ("elastic" currency) to banks to
meet the public's demand to convert deposits to
currency. To do this, the Federal Reserve would
accept certain bank assets as collateral against
"discount window" loans.
The intended function ofthe lender-of-Iast-resort
was to reduce the cost to the banking system of
meeting unexpected deposit withdrawals. While
this may be possible, a lender-of-Iast-resort does
not necessarily eliminate the potential for bank
runs because bank runs involve more than bank
liquidity.
Risk
The existence of risk is also necessary for bank
runs to occur. When a bank incurs losses that
exceed stockholder equity, it becomes unable to
repay its obligations to depositors. As depositors
perceive the potential for such losses, they will
attempt to withdraw their funds (which are
redeemable at par or face value) before other
depositors in order to avoid any personal loss.
Losses sustained by banks result primarily from
their exposure to interest rate and credit risk,
fraud, and insider abuse. The Federal Reserve
was not intended to provide a general indem-
nification to bank stockholders or depositors
from losses connected with these types of bank
risk. Indeed, when it makes loans, the Federal
Reserve must require full collateral. This means
that when banks borrow at the discount window
of the Federal Reserve, their assets are dis-
counted to reflect changes due to movements in
market interest rates and variations in asset
quality. Thus, with the lender-of-Iast-resort
providing only liquidity, depositors could
remain at substantial risk of loss and have good
reason to run on troubled banks.
III-defined property rights
A depositor's incentive to withdraw funds when
the solvency of a bank is in question comes from
being able to escape liability for losses should
the bank fail. Simply put, those depositors able
to withdraw funds before a bank is closed can
avoid losses entirely, while those that do notFRBSF
withdraw in time bear a greater than propor-
tional share of the losses. This uncertainty over
individual liability represents a problem of
poorly defined property rights. In effect, deposi-
tors who withdraw "early" take property away
from other depositors.
Economists have long argued that whenever
property rights are not well-defined, private mar-
kets fail to operate efficiently. It follows then that
public policy measures that remove the ambigu-
ities regarding property rights can enhance effi-
ciency. In the case of bank runs, this means
removing the uncertainty about who will be lia-
ble for the losses of an insolvent bank.
Deposit insurance
Uncertainty over depositor liability was virtually
eliminated with the institution offederal deposit
insurance in the 1930s despite limits on
coverage. The temporary deposit insurance plan
enacted in 1933 provided for insurance
coverage of up to $2,500, and deposit coverage
also was limited in the 1935 legislation that
authorized a permanent federal deposit insur-
ance system.
Even with limited coverage, deposit insurance
was effective because, as Friedman and Sch-
wartz have argued in their Monetary History of
the U.S., deposit insurance was intended to be
much broader than what was implied by the
statutes. This view is consistent with how
deposit insurance actually has been admin-
istered. Throughout most of its 50-plus year his-
tory, federal deposit insurance gave virtually all
depositors de facto coverage. With little or no
uncertainty regarding liability, depositors have
had little reason to run.
The stability ofthe banking system since the
1930s attests to the ability of deposit insurance
to prevent runs. In recent years, federal deposit
insurance is widely credited with keeping confi-
dence in the banking system, even though close
to 500 banks and savings and loans have failed
since 1980. Events in Ohio and Maryland in
1985 highlighted the effectivenessof federal
deposit insurance. Federally insured institutions
were completely insulated from the turmoil cre-
ated by the failure of thrifts covered by insur-
ance systems chartered by those two states.
No panacea
Even though the federal deposit insurance sys-
tem has been successful in preventing runs, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
briefly pursued a policy of not covering losses
for depositors with balances that exceeded the
statutory maximum (currently $100,000). This
policy was reflected in the experimental "modi-
fied payout plan" designed to put large deposi-
tors at risk. The plan was initiated in early 1984
and effectively terminated in May of that year in
the wake of the Continental Illinois Bank crisis.
In attempting to increase the risk of loss to some
depositors, the FDIC was exploring one way! to
cope with the complication that deposit insur-
ance's success has created problems of its own.
In particular, insurance has removed the incen-
tive for depositors to monitor the "prudence" of
banking institutions, and thereby eroded the
market discipline that would otherwise constrain
the risk-taking behavior of banks.
Moreover, under the federal deposit insurance
system as it has been administered, banks pay
the same insurance premium rates regardless of
the riskiness of their portfolios. This gives banks
an incentive to take on more risk than they
would in the absence of insurance. The cost of
this excess risk-taking is borne most immediately
by the deposit insurance funds, and ultimately
by the general taxpaying public. Thus, deposit
insurance, in solving the bank run problem by
eliminating depositor liability, creates a distor-
tion by shifting the liability to the insurance fund
and the public.
While the potential distortions to risk-taking are
widely recognized, increasing risk to large
depositors and the other so-called "market disci-
pline" approaches (including co-insurance) do
not appear to be acceptable policy options. Reg-
ulators are concerned that shifting risk to deposi-
tors when banks still finance a sizable portion of
their assets with liquid deposits will only re-
introduce the problem of bank runs.
Another perspective
The problem of bank runs and the incentive for
excessive risk-taking both result from poorly
defined property rights. Thus, both problems
could be solved simultaneously by clearly defi-ning property rights in the event of a bank insol-
vency. One way to define property rights would
be to keep depositors from escaping their share
of bank losses by being the first to withdraw. To
do this, the liability connected with liquid
deposits would have to be extended for some
period beyond the time of withdrawal. That is,
both present and certain past depositors of an
individual bank would be kept at risk in the
eventthebankfailed. With the threat of an ex
post levy, a depositor would view his losses as
independent of his decision to withdraw funds
and thus would have no reason to run.
As a practical matter, a working definition of
when a depositor's liability ended - that is,
what constitutes a past depositor - would have
to be devised. Also, a government agency might
be required to enforce the ex post levies on
depositors. However, federal deposit insurance,
with its undesirable side effects on risk-taking,
would not be necessary. With well-defined
property rights, depositors would demand higher
interest rates from riskier banks and thus impose
a check on bank risk-taking.
Enforcing depositor liability for losses might be
difficult because of operational or, what is more
likely, political complications. If so, a second
solution to the property rights problem would be
to shift the liability for losses to equity holders of
banks. In other words, bank owners would have
to bear all the losses. Ifthis could be accom-
plished, depositors would be protected just as
they are with full deposit insurance. Yet, since
bank equity holders would bear all potential
losses, they would have no incentive to take
excessive risks.
Under the current regulatory and legal frame-
work, bank stockholders bear all losses only if
regulators close a troubled institution before its
net worth, measured on a market value basis,
falls below zero. Historically, regulatory agen-
cies have tended to give problem institutions an
opportunity to regain their financial health and
have defined bank solvency in terms of book
value. Together, these practices more or less
ensure that, when an institution is finally c1qsed,
it will have negative net worth. Thus, neither
depositors nor equity holders now fully bear the
losses offailed banks.
For market discipline via equity holders to be
effective, several changes would be needed.
One is to give the regulatory agencies the power
and incentives to close depository institutions
more swiftly. Even so, it is likely that some failed
banks would have negative net worth. It may
also be desirable, therefore, to hold bank equity
holders liable for losses exceeding their original
investment. In fact, something similar to this
approach was actually in effect prior to the
1930s, when stockholders of nationally char-
tered banks could be held liable for losses up to
twice the amount of paid-in capital. Alter-
natively, ifequity holders were held liable for all
losses, they would have the incentive to close
their institution before losses mounted.
Conclusion
Depositor runs are generally regarded as prob-
lems of bank liquidity. However, by itself,
providing liquidity to banks does not eliminate
the problem of runs. Banks incur losses from
exposure to various types of risk, and the liquid
nature of much oftheir funds gives a depositor
the means to escape the liability for losses usu-
ally borne by a debtholder.
Federal deposit insurance has been successful in
preventing runs by virtually eliminating deposi-
tor risk. But it has also created incentives for
excessive risk-taking by banks. It has done so by
shifting the liability for bank losses to the insur-
ance fund and, ultimately, the taxpaying public,
and away from those with close ties to the bank
- its depositors and stockholders. The problem
of runs could be solved without the drawbacks
of the current insurance system by enforcing lia-
bilities for losses more stringently so that deposi-
tors cannot avoid them merely by withdrawing
funds, or by taking steps to make sure equity
holders are held liable for all bank losses.
Frederick T. Furlong and Michael C. Keeley
Opinionsexpressed in this newsletterdo not necessarily reflect theviews ofthe managementof the Federal Reserve Bank ofSan
Francisco, orofthe Board of Governorsofthe Federal Reserve System.
Editorialcommentsmaybe addressedtotheeditor(GregoryTong) ortotheauthor....FreecopiesofFederal Reservepublications
can beobtainedfrom the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco, P.O. Box 7702, San Francisco
94120. Phone (415) 974-2246.BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT














uo~6U!4S0m 4o~n U060JO 0POI\0U







Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 200,473 220 7,075 3.6
Loans and Leases1 6 182,637 330 8,087 4.6
Commercial and Industrial 51,510 - 217 - 165 - 0.3
Real estate 66,222 - 347 2,701 4.2
Loans to Individuals 39,364 - 11 4,650 13.3
Leases 5,570 - 11 182 3.3
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 10,505 122 - 1,497 -12.4
Other Securities2 7,330 - 232 483 7.0
Total Deposits 209,892 9,537 8,013 3.9
Demand Deposits 56,142 7,359 5,624 11.1
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 37,163 3,370 6,236 20.1
OtherTransaction Balances4 16,784 914 2,581 18.1
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,966 1,264 - 191 - 0.1
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 47,096 539 2,441 5.4
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 or more 35,581 - 87 - 2,425 - 6.3
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 22,753 795 - 119 - 0.5
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)jDeficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.s. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TT&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change